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INTRODUCTION

Congress advocates the position that foreign bribery in a commercial context contributes to foreign relations problems, a perception of corporate immorality, and erosion of the free market
system.1 By enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977
(FCPA),2 the United States initiated a unilateral attack on the
problem of commercial bribery abroad. Commentators frequently

1.

CONFERENCE REPORT FROM THE COMMITfEE OF CONFERENCE TO ACCOMPANY

S. 305, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4121 [hereinafter
cited as CONF. REP.].

2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. II 1978) (amending scattered sections of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)).
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criticize the FCPA's unilateral approach, noting that it places
United States companies at a competitive disadvantage overseas.'
It is generally recognized that multilateral support is necessary
before significant progress can be made in halting the prevalent
4
practice of payments to foreign officials for business advantages.
In fact, one of the purposes of the FCPA was "to strengthen the
United States position in negotiations concerning bilateral and
multilateral antibribery agreements."' 5 By promulgating a Draft
International Agreement on Illicit Payments (Agreement),6 the
United Nations has presented a vehicle whereby a concerted attack on questionable payments can be launched. The FCPA and
the Agreement have the same basic aim-to discourage illicit payments in an international context. Additionally, both use a combination of disclosure and criminalization to achieve their goal.
There are, however, significant differences between the Agreement and the FCPA. These possible areas of conflict must be examined and weighed against the need for an international approach before the United States extends its support of the
Agreement.
This Note will provide an overview of both the FCPA and the
Agreement. Additionally, it will examine the interface between
the two measures, giving special attention to possible areas of
contention.
II.

OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

A.

Background and Legislative History

The problem of corporate bribery in a foreign setting first came
to light during the Watergate Committee Hearings and the Special Prosecutor's investigation of illegal domestic campaign contributions.7 Upon discovering questionable foreign payments and

3. North, The Economics of Extortion, 10 WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1978, at 30.
4. See 78 Dm'T STATE BULL. 27 (1977).
5. 123 CONG. REC. S19,399 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen.

Williams).
6. Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payments, Report of the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments on Its First and
Second Sessions, U.N. ESCOR, (2d regular session, agenda item 9), U.N. Doc. E/
1979/104 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Agreement].

7.

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND IL-

LEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES,

submitted to the Senate Banking,

Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, May 12, 1976, at 2 [hereinafter cited as
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concomitant corporate record falsification,8 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) developed both enforcement 9 and voluntary disclosure 0 programs to control corporate bribery abroad.
Over 400 corporations came forward and admitted making questionable or illegal payments to foreign politicians, political parties, and government officials."'
In view of the disclosures made to the SEC, various congressional committees held hearings on the subject of foreign bribery
by United States corporations. 2 Responding to the need for modification of United States corporate behavior abroad, the House
passed H.R. 3815,13 which took a criminalization approach to foreign corporate bribery. The Senate adopted S.305, 1" which included disclosure and accounting requirements in addition to
prohibitions against certain overseas payments by domestic companies. Upon contemplation of the two bills, the conference committee produced a modified version of S.305.15 Both the Senate
and the House adopted the new proposal,16 which utilized a combination of accounting requirements 17 and criminal sanctions' s to
SEC

REPORT].

8. Id.
9. The SEC enforcement program consisted of injunctive actions in which
corporations, without denying or admitting the charges against them, agreed to
a judgment of permanent injunction. Id. at 4.
10. Under the voluntary disclosure program, independent parties conducted
an investigation, answered to a committee of impartial board members, and filed
a report with the SEC. Id. at 6-13.
11. REPORT FROM THE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
TOGETHER WITH MINORITY VIEWS TO AccoMPANY H.R. 3815, UNLAWFUL CORPOACT OF 1977, H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977).
12. See generally, ProhibitingBribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976); Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign Policy:
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporationsof the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Part 12, 1 (1975).
RATE PAYMENTS

13.

123 CONG. REc. H11,930 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 1977).

14. 123 CONG. REC. S7,193 (daily ed. May 5, 1977). S. 305, Title I, is similar
to S. 3664, which was reported to the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee in Sept. 1976, but was not considered before the end of the 94th
Session.
15. CoNF. REP., supra note 1.
16. 123 CONG. REc. H12,826 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1977); 123 CONG. REC. S19,398
(daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(Supp. H 1978).
18. Id. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
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combat United States corporate bribery abroad. On December 19,
1977, President Carter signed the FCPA into law. 19
B. Accounting Provisions
Section 102 of the FCPA20 contains accounting provisions requiring both the maintenance of accurate records 21 and internal
accounting controls. 22 These provisions only apply to issuers subject to either section 15(d) or section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act).23 Congress enacted section
102 to prevent off-the-book slush funds, often used to make questionable payments abroad.24 It should be noted, however, that
these accounting provisions are applicable to the specified companies regardless of whether they have foreign dealings.25
The accurate records provisions of section 102 require reporting
companies to "make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." 26 There is
support for the proposition that this records requirement also
pertains to an issuer's equity, liability, income, and expense accounts, even though the precise wording only refers to an issuer's
assets.2
Section 102 of the FCPA also requires that issuers "devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls.

19. See 78

DEP'T STATE BULL.

'2

Issuers

27 (1978).

20. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. H 1978).
21. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
22. Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
23. Id. § 78m(b)(2).
24. CONF. REP., supra note 1, at 10.
25. Note, In Search of an InternationalSolution to Bribery: The Impact of

the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 on CorporateBehavior, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L

L. 359, 369 (1979).

26. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 111978).
27. SEC Release No. 34-13185, Questionable or Illegal Corporate Payments
and Practices, 42 Fed. Reg. 4854, 4856 n.7 (1977) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.

§ 240).
28.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B). Additionally, section 102 provides:

(b) [The internal accounting control system must] provide reasonable
assurances that (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization;

(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted ac-

Fall 19801

COMPARISON

should base their form of internal accounting control systems
upon a cost/benefit analysis. 29 Factors to be considered include
the diversity of company operations, the degree of upper-level
management contact with daily operations, the size of the company, and the extent of management centralization."
The accounting provisions exempt national security matters
when the head of an agency or department dealing which such an

area issues a written directive pursuant to presidential authority.31 Commentators have noted that this national security, ex-

emption results in a loophole which may be used "to immunize
the very aerospace and other defense-related enterprises whose
improper activities abroad led to congressional passage of the

statute."'3 2
Section 102 does not include specific sanctions for violations of
the accounting provisions.3 " SEC Chairman Williams, however,
has stated that the section can be enforced "by the same tools as
the balance of the federal securities laws."3 4 Thus far, the SEC

has focused on civil injunctive actions. 5

counting principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (H) to maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is
taken with respect to any differences.
29. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 4098, 4106.

30. Id.
31. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(3)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
32. Note, A Congressional Response to the Problem of Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1265 (1978).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. H 1978).
34. Address by SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams Before the American
Accounting Association in Denver, at 16 (Aug. 22, 1978), reprinted in 10 L. &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1261 (1978).

35. See, e.g., SEC v. Katy Indus., Inc., No. 78-3476 (N.D. IM.Aug. 30, 1978),
discussed in [1978] 469 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) at A-i; SEC v. Page Airways, Inc., [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,393 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1978); SEC
v. Aminex Resources Corp., [1978] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %96,352 (D.D.C.
Mar. 9, 1978).
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C. Antibribery Provisions
Sections 10336 and 104 3 of the FCPA contain antibribery provisions criminalizing certain types of foreign payments. Although
similar in language and scope, the two sections are applicable to
different categories of companies and individuals. Section 103 applies to issuers required to file under section 15(d) or register
under section 12 of the Exchange Act.38 On the other hand, section 104 applies to domestic concerns,3 9 which include any United
States citizen, national, or resident, and any partnership, corporation, joint-stock company, association, unincorporated organization, business trust, or sole proprietorship which is either organized under the laws of a State of the United States or has its
principal place of business within the United States.40 Both sections 103 and 104 also apply to officers, directors, employees,
agents, and
stockholders acting on behalf of an issuer or domestic
41
concern.

Sections 103 and 104 make it unlawful to use the mails or any
instrumentality of interstate commerce "corruptly in furtherance
of" an offer, payment, promise, gift, or authorization of money or
anything of value.4 2 The term "interstate commerce" is defined as
"trade, commerce, transportation, or communication among the
several States, or between any foreign country and any State or
between any State and any place or ship outside thereof."43 Additionally, "interstate commerce" expressly includes the intrastate
use of an interstate means
of communication or any other inter44
state instrumentality.
Payments covered under the antibribery provisions are prohibited if made to foreign officials, 5 or foreign political parties, party
officials, or political candidates.4 6 The FCPA defines a "foreign
official" as "any officer or employee of a foreign government of
any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or any person
36. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (Supp. II 1978).

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. § 78dd-2.
Id. § 78dd-l(a).
Id. § 78dd-2(a).
Id. § 78dd-2(d)(1).
Id. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
Id.
Id. § 78dd-2(d)(3).

44. Id.
45. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(1), 78dd-2(a)(1).
46. Id. §§ 78dd-i(a)(2), 78dd-2(a)(2).
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acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such government
or department, agency or instrumentality."4 7 Additionally, the
prohibited payments cannot be made to persons who the issuer or
domestic concern knows or has reason to know will directly or
indirectly offer, promise, or give the payment for prohibited
purposes.4 8
Payments are illegal if they are intended to influence the recipient's official decision or act.4 9 The antibribery provisions also prohibit payments intended to induce the payee to influence or affect
50
any act or decision of a foreign instrumentality or government.
It is important to note, however, that sections 103 and 104 incorporate a "business purpose" test: payments are only illegal if they
are made for the purpose of aiding the issuer or domestic concern
in "obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing busi'51
ness to any person.
Jurisdiction under the FCPA is not as limited as a first reading
of the statute might imply. Although jurisdiction arises when
there is a use of the mails or other instrumentality or means of
interstate commerce, the statute provides that the means need
52
only be used "in furtherance" of making an illicit payment.
Additionally, even though jurisdiction does not extend to a
United States company's foreign subsidiary that does not fit
within the definition of an issuer or domestic concern,53 the
United States parent business would incur liability under the antibribery provisions if it uses its foreign subsidiary to make pro-

47. Id. § 78dd-l(b).
48. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3). This provision covers commercial
agents and consultants employed by United States companies overseas and encourages management's careful scrutiny of its agents' actions. S. REP. No. 114,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 4098, 4108.
49. Payments are also prohibited if they are intended to influence the recipient to fail to perform official functions. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A),

(a)(3)(A); § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A), (a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1 1978).
50. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B), (a)(3)(B); § 78dd-2(a)(1)(B), (a)(2)(B),
(a)(3)(B).
51. Id. § 78dd-1(a)(1),(2),(3); § 78dd-2(a)(1),(2),(3). CONF.REP., supranote 1,
at 12.
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. H 1978). See Note, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act: Problems of ExtraterritorialApplication, 12 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 695 (1979).
53. See 123 CONG. REc. S19,399 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 1977).
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hibited payments on its behalf.5 The term "corruptly" also serves
as a limitation on jurisdiction. According to the legislative history,
the word implies an evil motive or purpose, indicating an intent
to improperly influence the payee.5 5 Finally, the antibribery provisions of section 103 and section 104 do not extend to payments
made for the purpose of facilitating ministerial duties of lowerlevel officials. Aimed at preventing bribes that are intended to affect discretionary decisions, the FCPA specifically excludes "any
employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or
instrumentality thereof whose duties are essentially ministerial or
clerical."5 " The legislative history recognizes that these "grease
payments" are generally accepted in many countries and are unlikely to be significantly reduced by unilateral United States ac-

tion.

7

Therefore, the FCPA does not prohibit payments such as

those to expedite the processing of documents or the granting of
licenses.
Sections 103 and 104 provide tough penalties for violators.
Upon conviction, an issuer or domestic concern can be fined up to
one million dollars.5 ' An individual who is a domestic concern, or
an officer, director, or stockholder acting on behalf of an issuer or
domestic concern, can be fined up to ten thousand dollars and/or

54. CONF.REP., supra note 1, at 13-14. See Note, supra note 52, at 696; Note,
supra note 32, at 1276. Even if a United States company were immune from suit
under the antibribery provisions, the SEC might be able to bring action under §
102.
For instance, although a foreign subsidiary of a United States company
makes a foreign payment without the requisite nexus with United States
interstate commerce, the SEC can argue that the parent corporation failed
to devise and maintain accounting controls adequate to expose the payment of the foreign subsidiary. Under the FCPA, the parent company cannot raise the defense that they were ignorant of bribes made by the foreign
subsidiary by looking the other way.
Note, supra note 25, at 369. See S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1977).
55. H. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1977). It also appears that
Congress intended to exclude payments given as a result of extortion. SENATE
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT TO ACCoMPANY S
305, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT oF 1977 AND DOMESTIc AND FOREIGN IN-

1977, TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL
VIEWS, S. REP. No. 144, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1977).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d) (Supp. II 1978). Payment to an official with discretionary duties is exempt from the FCPA if made only to speed performance of a
ministerial act. CONF. REP., supra note 1, at 12.
57. H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
VESTMENTS IMPROVEMENT DIsCLOSuRE AcT OF

58.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1), 78dd-2(b)(1)(A) (Supp. II 1978).

Fall 19801

COMPARISON

be imprisoned for up to five years if he wilfully violated section
103 or 104. 59 Additionally, upon a finding of a company's violation
of the antibribery provisions, an employee or agent of the company who wilfully carries out a prohibited action may be fined up
to ten thousand dollars, imprisoned for up to five years, or both."
An employee or agent faces penalty under this provision only if
he is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 1 It is important to note, however, that the United States company cannot
pay, directly or indirectly, any fine levied against a director, officer, employee, stockholder, or agent. 62
Both the SEC and the Justice Department have enforcement
responsibilities under the FCPA antibribery provisions. The Justice Department handles all criminal prosecutions 3 and investigates alleged acts of foreign corrupt payments by domestic
concerns." The SEC is responsible for all investigations, administrative proceedings, and civil injunctive actions pertaining to reporting companies. 5 Additionally, the FCPA empowers the Attorney General to bring civil injunctive actions whenever it
appears that any domestic concern or its officer, director, agent,
stockholder, or employee is engaged, or about to engage, in a violation of the antibribery provisions. 6 6 Further, although not specifically provided for in the FCPA, the SEC contemplates a private right of action for persons injured by prohibited foreign
67
payments.
I.

OVERVIEW OF DRAFT INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT ON ILLICIT

PAYMENTS

On May 18, 1979, the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments (Committee) adopted the draft report

59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(b)(1)(B), 78dd-2(b)(2), 78ff(c)(2) (Supp. H 1978).

60. Id. §§ 78dd-2(b)(3), 78ff(c)(3).
61. Id.
62. Id. §§ 78ff(c)(4), 78dd-2(b)(4).
63. S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 640,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1977).
64. H.R. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977).
65. Supra note 63.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (Supp. I 1978).
67. See H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). See generally
Note, The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct of 1977: A Private Right of Action, 12
VmD. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735 (1979).
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on its first and second sessions.6 8 The Committee's report contains both the text of the Agreement6 9 and notes concerning delegations' views on controversial provisions. 0 The Agreement, in its
present draft form, utilizes both disclosure and criminalization
approaches to combat illicit payments in an international
71
context.
A.

Records Provisions

Article 6 of the Agreement 2 contains records provisions pertaining to payments in connection with international transactions. The Agreement defines an "international commercial transaction" as follows:
[inter alia] any sale, contract or any other business transaction,
actual or proposed, with a national, regional or local government or
any [public or governmental authority or agency] or any business
transaction involving an application for governmental approval of a
sale, contract or any other business transaction, actual or proposed,
relating to the supply or purchase of goods, services, capital or
technology emanating from [another State].73
Additionally, an "international commercial transaction" includes
any acquisition of or application for production rights or proprietary interests from a government by a foreign enterprise or
national.7 4
68. Report of the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments on Its First and Second Sessions (2d regular session, agenda item 9) 21,
U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/1979/104 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Report].
69. Agreement, supra note 6.
70. Notes on the Draft International Agreement on Illicit Payments, U.N.
ESCOR, Report of the Committee on an International Agreement on Illicit Payments on Its First and Second Sessions (2d regular session, agenda item 9) U.N.
Doc. E/1979/104 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Notes]. After being reported to the
Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Transnational Corporations, Report, supra note 68, at 2, the Draft Agreement was to have gone to a
conference of plenipotentiaries to be concluded. Notes, 8 n.1.
71. See Agreement, supra note 6.
72. Id. art. 6, at 5.
73. Id. art. 2(b), at 3. The article 2(b) definition of "international commercial
transaction" begins with "[inter alia]," indicating that the examples given are
not exclusive. It should be noted, however, that the words "inter alia" are
bracketed, signifying disagreement over their inclusion in the final text. See Report, supra note 68, at 2.
74. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2(b), at 3.

COMPARISON
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Article 6 is applicable to enterprises or other juridical persons
established within the territory of a contracting state.7 5 Under
penalty of law, 76 the covered businesses must maintain accurate
records of payments made by them to an intermediary, or received by them as an intermediary, in connection with an international commercial transaction.7 7 The Agreement defines an "intermediary" as any enterprise or other natural or juridical person
who, in connection with an international commercial transaction,
deals or negotiates with a public official on behalf of any other
enterprise or natural or juridical person. 78 Article 6 also provides
that the records must include the names and addresses of any
intermediary or intermediaries receiving payments.7 9 Additionally, covered companies must record the date and amount of such
80
payment.
Article 10 of the Agreement"' provides that records maintained
pursuant to article 6 must be produced when they will aid in another contracting state's investigations or proceedings under the
antibribery provisions discussed below.82 Production of records to
assist another contracting state is limited, however, by the requested state's law, essential national interests, and need of
confidentiality.83
B.

Antibribery Provisions

Article 1 of the Agreement 8 contains antibribery provisions
prohibiting certain types of payments in an international context.
Contracting states must prohibit the following actions:

75. Id. art. 6, at 5.
76. The Agreement does not specify the form of penalty for violations of
article 6.

77. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6, at 5.
78. Id. art. 2(c), at 3.
79. Id. art. 6, at 5. One delegation felt that the followiing information should
also be required under the records provisions: "and, to the extent known by the

party concerned, the name and address of any public official who is retained by
or has a financial interest in the intermediary." Notes, supra note 70, at 12.

80. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6, at 5.
81. Id. art. 10, at 6.
82. Id. art. 10(3).
83.

Id. The "essential national interests" limitation on production of records

is bracketed, signalling dissension among Committee members. See Report,
supra note 68, at 2.
84. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1, at 3.
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the offering, promising or giving of any payment, gift or other advantage by any natural person, on his own behalf or on behalf of
any enterprise or any other person whether juridical or natural, to
or for the benefit of a public official as undue consideration for
performing or refraining from the performance of his duties in connection with an international commercial transaction. 5
Additionally, article 1 prohibits a public official from directly or
indirectly soliciting, accepting, demanding, or receiving any gift,
payment, or other advantage as undue8 6 consideration for performing or refraining from performing his duties in connection
with any international commercial transaction.8 7 According to the
Agreement, a "public official" includes the following: (1) any appointed or elected official at the local, regional, or national level
holding a judicial, military, administrative, or legislative office; 88
(2) any government employee; (3) any public or governmental
agency or authority employee; and (4) any other person performing a public function.89
Article 1 of the Agreement takes a criminalization approach to
the problem of international bribery8 0 Contracting states must
punish offending public officials and natural persons by "appropriate criminal penalties under its national law."9 1 Additionally,
the Agreement requires criminal sanctions for violations by juridical persons. 2 If, however, a contracting state's national law does
not recognize criminal responsibility of a juridical person, the
state must take appropriate measures aimed at achieving deterrent effects comparable to that of criminal liability.9 3
Article 3 of the Agreement provides that contracting states
must "take all practicable measures"9' 4 to prevent violations of the
85. Id. art. 1(a). See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
86. Some delegations state that the term "undue" should not be inserted to
qualify the word "consideration." Notes, supra note 70, at 8.
87. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(b), at 3.
88. Both temporary and permanent officials are subject to the antibribery
provisions. Id. art. 2(a).
89. Id. art. 2(a).
90. Id. art. 1(1).
91. Id.
92. Id. art. 1(2).
93. Id.
94. One delegation noted that "the word 'practicable' is subject to differing
interpretations and might be viewed as meaning that federal States shall carry
out their obligations under article 3 in accordance with their respective constitutional systems." Notes, supra note 70, at 10.
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antibribery provisions." Although article 3 expressly limits itself
to measures aimed at preventing article 1 offenses,96 one delegation advocated drafting the prevention provision in such a manner that violations under the Agreement not specified in article 1
could also be covered.9
Article 4 of the Agreement contains jurisdictional requirements. 98 Under article 4 paragraph 1, each contracting state must
take measures to establish its jurisdiction over article 1 antibribery violations when the offense is committed within its territory9 9 or has effects within the state.10 0 Article 4 paragraph 1 also
requires a contracting state to establish its jurisdiction over article 1 offenses when the recipient is a public official of the state101
or when the payment if proffered by one of its own nationals,10 2
provided that an element of the violation, or an act aiding and
abetting the violation, is connected with the territory of the
state.1 08 Additionally, article 4 paragraph 3 requires that contracting states take measures to establish their jurisdiction over

any other offenses that might fall within the Agreement's scope
95. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3, at 4.
96. Id.
97. Notes, supra note 70, at 10.
98. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4, at 4.
99. Id. art. 4(1)(a).
100. Id. art. 4(1)(d). This provision is bracketed, indicating lack of agreement among delegations. See Report, supra note 68, at 2.
101. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(1)(b), at 4.
102. The text of this requirement states that:
[a Contracting State must establish its jurisdiction] over the offense.
relating to any payment, gift or other advantage in connection with [the
negotiation, conclusion, retention, reversion or termination of] an international commercial transaction when the offense is committed by a national of that State, provided that any element of that offense, or any act
aiding or abetting that offense, is connected with the territory of that

State.
Id. art. 4(1)(c). It should be noted that some delegations advocated inclusion of
juridical persons, in addition to natural persons, to make the article 4 jurisdictional requirements more closely parallel the article 1 offenses. Notes, supra
note 70, at 11. Additionally, certain delegations stated that the bracketed language qualifying the words "international commercial transaction" unduly limited the scope of jurisdiction. Id. Other delegations, however, stated that the
bracketed language was necessary to comply with their states' law of jurisdiction, since their legal systems do not assert jurisdiction based solely on national-

ity. Id.
103. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 4(1)(c), at 4.
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when that violation is committed by a public official of the state,
in the territory of the state, by a juridical person established
within the state, or by a national of the state.10 4
Article 5 of the Agreement contains mandatory prosecution
provisions.105 The Agreement states that if a contracting state has
article 4 paragraph 1 jurisdiction over an article 1 bribery
offender found within its territory, it must, without exception,
submit the case to its appropriate authorities for prosecution.,,"
Further, the Agreement expressly provides that prosecution is
mandatory, whether or not the contracting state extradited the
alleged offender. 0 7 One delegation noted that the prosecution requirement should have been extended to any offense within the
scope of the Agreement over which the contracting state has jurisdiction under article 4 paragraph 3, regardless whether the offense falls within the article 1 antibribery provisions. 08
Article 11 of the Agreement contains provisions relating to
extradition. 0 9 Under article 11, "offenses [referred to in article 1 /
within the scope of this Agreement]" shall be deemed to be included as extraditable offenses in any extradition treaty existing
between Contracting States.""' Future extradition treaties between contracting states must also include article 1 violations as
extraditable offenses." 2 Additionally, for purposes of extradition,
the offense must be treated "as if it had been committed not only
in the place in which it occurred but also in the territories of the
States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with
104. Id. art. 4(3). This requirement is bracketed, signifying a lack of consensus on its inclusion. See Report, supra note 68, at 2. It should also be noted that
the Agreement "does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with the national law of a Contracting State." Agreement, supra note 6,

art. 4(2), at 4.
105. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5, at 4-5.

106. Id. art. 5(1), at 4.
107.
108.
109.
110.
phrases

Id. art. 5(3), at 5.
Notes, supra note 70, at 11.
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11, at 7.
Delegations were in disagreement concerning which of the bracketed
should be incorporated. The "article 1" language would limit the extra-

dition provisions to bribery offenses, while the words "within the scope of the
Agreement" would extend article 11 to the records provisions. Notes, supra note
70, at 13.
111. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11(1), at 7.
112. Id.
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article 4, paragraph 1. "1
If a contracting state's national law makes extradition conditional upon the existence of a treaty, it "[may at its option/
shall] ' 114 consider the Agreement to be the legal basis for the alleged offender's extradition when it receives an extradition request from another contracting state with which it does not have
such a treaty. 5 Extradition in such a case, however, is subject to
1 16
any conditions provided by the requested state's national law.
Under circumstances in which contracting states do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty, they "[shall/
may at their option]"11 7 recognize the violation as an extraditable
offense between their countries, subject to any conditions required by the requested state's law. 8
The Agreement contains mutual assistance provisions to aid in
its enforcement.""' Under article 10, contracting states must give
each other "the greatest possible measure of assistance in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings1 20 brought in
respect to any of the offenses [referred to in article 1/within the

113. Id. Agreement, art. 11(4).
114. "Several States that do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty... insisted on the need to retain the word 'shall'... in order
to ensure that States could extradite without a treaty and those that could not
extradite without a treaty made an equal commitment." Notes, supra note 70, at
14.
115. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11(2), at 7.
116. Id.
117. Numerous delegations asserted that the "may at their option" language
should be deleted. Notes, supra note 70, at 13-14. Another delegation, however,
noted that systems of extradition vary greatly from state to state, and advocated
the position that it is "necessary to retain the possibility of using the Agreement
as an optional legal basis for extradition in line with the precedents in numerous
other agreements." Id. at 14.
118. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11(3), at 7.
119. Id. art. 10, at 6.
120. One delegation pointed out that, owing to the broadening of the scope
of the applicability of the draft agreement by the introduction of the article 1
provisions for punishment of juridical persons, the mutual assistance contracting
states should lend to one another ought not only refer to criminal proceedings
and investigations that would be launched against the alleged offender, but
should also cover proceedings and investigations of an administrative or civil
nature and, since a number of delegations were unable to agree to that interpretation, that delegation reserved its position with respect to the ultimate acceptance of article 10. Notes, supra note 70, at 13.
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scope of this Agreement]. '121 The extent to which assistance must
be provided is determined by the law of the requested state.12 2 As
far as permissible under the requested state's national law, mutual assistance should also be given to aid in investigations and
proceedings1 2 3 concerning article 1 violations committed by juridical persons. 2 4 Under the Agreement, mutual assistance includes
the following types of aid: (1) production of records maintained
pursuant to the requirements of article 6; (2) production of documents and other needed information; (3) taking of evidence; (4)
service of documents germane to court proceedings or investigations; and (5) notice of the initiation and result of public criminal
proceedings under the article 1 antibribery provisions. 2 5 This last
type of assistance need only be given to other contracting states
that may, under article 4, also have jurisdiction over the same
violations. 26 It should be noted, however, that the requirement
for mutual assistance is limited by the requested state's laws, essential national interests, and need to preserve the confidential
nature of documents and other information. 2 "
The Agreement provides that any information or evidence obtained pursuant to article 10 must be used solely for the purpose
of enforcing the Agreement.1 28 All evidence and information must
be kept confidential, except to the extent that disclosure is
mandatory in enforcement proceedings. 2 9 The Agreement states
that any other use of the information is permitted only with the
approval of the requested state.1 30
Further, upon mutual agreement, contracting states shall enter
into negotiations towards bilateral agreements to facilitate mu-

121. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10(1), at 6.
122. Id.
123. One delegation reserved its position on this clause because the French

language text only referred to "mutual judicial assistance." Notes, supra note
70, at 13.
124. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10(2), at 6.

125. Id. art. 10(3).
126. Id. art. 10(3)(b).
127. Id. art. 10(3).
128. Id. art. 10(5). Various delegations felt that this provision would be considered applicable only to proceedings of a judicial nature in their states. Conversely, other delegations advocated the position that the provision's scope
should extend to non-judicial proceedings, such as those of an administrative
nature. Notes, supra note 70, at 13.
129. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 10(5), at 7.
130. Id.
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tual assistance under article 10.11" The article 10 mutual aid provisions, however, will not affect systems governing mutual assistance in criminal matters under any other bilateral or multilateral
132
treaty.
C.
1.

Miscellaneous Provisions
Southern Africa Provisions

Article 7 of the Agreement prohibits nationals and enterprises
of contracting states from having certain types of business contacts with "illegal minority regimes" in southern Africa."' It
should be noted, however, that the entire article is bracketed in
the text of the Agreement, signifying delegation disagreement
over its inclusion.' 3 ' The Committee agreed to retain the article
for further consideration by the conference of plenipotentiaries to
be convened at a later date. 3 5
In its present form, article 7 prohibits a contracting state's
nationals or enterprises from paying royalties or taxes to illegal
minority regimes in southern Africa.13 6 Enterprises and nationals
paying royalties or taxes in contravention of article 7 must report
the payments to their contracting states. 13 7 Additionally, contracting states must prohibit their enterprises and nationals from
"knowingly tranferring any assets or other financial resources in
contravention of United Nations resolutions to facilitate trade
with, or investment in a territory occupied by an illegal minority
regime in southern Africa."' 3 8 Finally, contracting states must
submit annual reports to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning any activities of its transnational corporations
collaborating directly or indirectly with the aforementioned regimes in disregard of United Nations resolutions. 39

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. art. 10(4).
Id. art. 10(6).
Id. art. 7.
Id.; see Report, supra note 68, at 2.
Notes, supra note 70, at 12.
Agreement, art. 7(1), supra note 6, at 5.
Id. art. 7(2).
Id. art. 7(1).
Id. art. 7(3).
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2. Voidability Provisions
Article 8 requires contracting states to recognize the voidability
of any international commercial transaction when an offense
within the scope of the Agreement is decisive in procuring the
consent of one of the parties to the transaction. 140 Further, a contracting state must ensure that its national law enables the party
to institute judicial proceedings to obtain damages, have the
transaction declared null and void, or both.14 1 It should be noted,

text of the Agreement
however, that article 8 is bracketed in the1 42
inclusion.
its
over
to signify disagreement
3. Free Flow of Information Provisions
Article 9 contains provisions pertaining to the free flow of information among contracting states. 43 When requested to do so,
contracting states must inform each other of the measures they
have taken to implement the Agreement.14 4 Each contracting
state must also furnish the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the following information concerning its implementation of the Agreement: (1) legislative measures; (2) administrative
regulations; (3) judicial proceedings; and (4) other measures taken
pursuant to the implementing laws and regulations.1 45 Further,
whenever final convictions have been obtained under laws
promulgated pursuant to the Agreement, contracting states must
furnish information concerning the case, the decision, and the
sanctions imposed. 146 Finally, the Secretary-General is responsible for circulating a summary of this information to the other
47
contracting states.1

140. Id. art. 8. Several delegations noted that article 8 would pose serious
constitutional, legislative, or juridical problems for them, especially since the
article would affect the area of private law which was not otherwise within the
scope of the Agreement. Notes, supra note 70, at 12.
141. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 8, at 5. Several delegations indicated that
article 8 would provide a strong deterrent against bribery in an international
context and felt the provision should be retained. Notes, supra note 70, at 12.
142. See Report, supra note 68, at 2.
143. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 9, at 5.
144. Id. art. 9(1), at 5.
145. Id. art. 9(2), at 6.
146. Id. The Agreement requires this information only to the extent it is not
viewed as confidential under the law of the requested contracting state. Id.
147. Id. art. 9(3), at 6.
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IV.

INTERFACE BETWEEN THE

FCPA

AND THE AGREEMENT

The FCPA and the Agreement were both drafted to combat
commercial bribery in the international arena. Consequently, they
should be compared to expose areas of interface. This examination reveals significant differences, as well as similarities, between
the two measures.
A. Records Provisions
The types of businesses covered under the records provisions of
the FCPA and the Agreement vary significantly. The article 6
provisions of the Agreement pertain to all enterprises and other
juridical persons established within the territory of a contracting
state. 148 By contrast, the FCPA accounting provisions only apply

to issuers subject to either section 15(d) or section 12 of the Exchange Act. 149 Thus, the FCPA would have to be expanded, or

other legislation would have to be passed, to bring United States
law into line with the Agreement's records provisions.
The type of transactions falling within the scope of the records
provisions of the Agreement and the FCPA also vary. The FCPA
records provisions cover all transactions and dispositions involving assets.1 50 There is no requirement of any interstate or foreign

commerce nexus.151 In comparison, the Agreement only requires
records to be kept of payments made to intermediaries in connection with international commercial dealings.1 52 Therefore, it is

apparent that the type of transaction covered under the FCPA is
significantly broader than the coverage required under the
Agreement.
The amount of detail required under the records provisions of
the two measures does not vary to a large degree. Under the
Agreement, records must be accurate and must include the date
and amount of payment and the names and addresses of intermediaries receiving payment. 53 The FCPA accounting provisions require reasonably detailed records that accurately and
fairly reflect transactions.1 " Thus, although the FCPA does not
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. art. 6, at 5.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. II 1978).

Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
See id. § 78m(b)(2).
Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6, at 5.

153. Id.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
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specify what constitutes "reasonable detail," the two measures
appear to have the same basic requirement-detailed, accurate
records.
The records provisions of the FCPA and the Agreement are
both under penalty of law. The FCPA accounting requirements
are enforceable by the same measures applicable to other Exchange Act violations. 55 As the Agreement does not specify the
nature of the required penalties, it is unlikely that conflict will
occur in this area.
Finally, the FCPA specifically provides for internal accounting
controls. 5 6 In comparison, the Agreement does not require the institution of such a system. Therefore, as the FCPA is broader
than the Agreement in this respect, additional legislation would
not have to be passed if the United States became a contracting
state under the Agreement in its present form.
B. Antibribery Provisions
There are significant differences between the FCPA and the
Agreement concerning the scope of individuals falling within the
category of recipients to whom covered individuals and businesses
are prohibited from offering payments. The FCPA prohibits the
giving of bribes to foreign officials, foreign political parties, foreign political party officials, and candidates for foreign political
office. 57 Additionally, the FCPA's coverage extends to payment
to any person knowing, or having reason to know, that the payment is for any of the aforementioned individuals or parties.1 5 8
On the other hand, the Agreement prohibits only illicit payments
to, or for the benefit'of, public officials. 5 9
The differing definitions of recipients under the FCPA and the
Agreement lead to two problems. First, the FCPA specifies that
payments cannot be made to foreign officials, in contrast to the
Agreement's prohibitions against bribes to any public official.
Therefore, the Agreement could be interpreted as prohibiting illicit payments to both foreign and domestic officials. This issue is
alleviated, however, by the existence of United States statutes
prohibiting the bribery of domestic officials and government em155. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.

156. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 111978).
157. Id. § 78dd-l(a)(1),(2); § 78dd-2(a)(1),(2).
158. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3).
159. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(1)(a), at 3.
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ployees. 16 0 Second, the FCPA and the Agreement differ in their
treatment of "grease payments." Although the Agreement does
not exempt payments to expedite routine functions, the FCPA
specifically excludes payments to facilitate ministerial or clerical
actions.16 1 An argument could be made that the Agreement's prohibition against "undue consideration" for the performance of official duties 162 would serve to exempt "grease payments" in states
where they are the norm, and are therefore "due." In light of the
lack of a specific exemption, however, it is unlikely that this was
the drafters' intent. Therefore, if the United States became a contracting state to the Agreement in its present form, the FCPA
exemption for "grease payments" would have to be amended.
The FCPA has jurisdiction only when there is a use of the
mails or other means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in
furtherance of the prohibited payment.1 3 In contrast, the Agreement does not have any corresponding restriction on the means
used in connection with the offering of the bribe. Although the
interstate instrumentality nexus language appears to put an
added limitation on FCPA jurisdiction over foreign bribery, it is
unlikely that a situation would arise in which there was no use of
the telephone or mails in furtherance of the illegal act.
The FCPA is broader than the Agreement concerning the types
of persons and businesses prohibited from making illicit payments. Domestic concerns and certain categories of issuers fit
within the FCPA antibribery provisions.16 4 The definition of a domestic concern includes United States citizens, nationals, and residents, in addition to virtually all forms of businesses organized
under United States laws or having their principal place of business within its territory. 6 5 The FCPA also covers officers, directors, employees, agents, and stockholders acting on behalf of an
issuer or domestic concern. 6 6 In comparison, the Agreement prohibits payments "by any natural person, on his own behalf or on
behalf of any enterprise or any other person whether juridical or

160. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1976). Similar statutes can also be found at
the state and local level.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (Supp. II 1978).
162. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(1)(a), at 3.
163. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. II 1978).
164. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
165. Id. § 78dd-2(d)(1).
166. Id. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
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As the Agreement is not broader than the FCPA in

this regard, the United States would not have to amend this aspect of its legislation should it become a contracting state to the
Agreement in its present form.
The FCPA and the Agreement have similar provisions concerning the form of prohibited bribes. The Agreement prohibits "the
offering, promising or giving of any payment, gift or other advantage."' 8 Likewise, the FCPA prohibits any payment, offer, promise to pay, or authorization to pay money. 8 9 Additionally, the
FCPA proscribes any gift, offer, promise to give, or authorization
to give anything of value.17 0 The Agreement's prohibition against

the giving of any "advantage" can be equated with the FCPA's
prohibition against the giving of "anything of value." Therefore,
the only real discrepancy pertains to the FCPA proscription
against the "authorization" of any bribe. This prohibition, however, is in addition to the Agreement's requirements and therefore presents no problem.
Both the FCPA and the Agreement incorporate "business-purpose" tests. The Agreement prohibits illicit payments to public
officials as undue consideration for performing or refraining from
performing his duties in connection with any international commercial transaction.17 ' On the other hand, the FCPA prohibits
bribes intended to influence the payee in his official capacity or to
induce him to use his influence to affect the acts of any government or its instrumentality. 17 2 Furthermore, these payments are
only prohibited under the FCPA if their purpose is either to direct business to anyone or to assist a company in obtaining or
retaining business.173 Thus, there are two primary differences between the FCPA and the Agreement regarding the prohibited
purpose of the illicit payments. First, the FCPA contains "inducement" language, which is not present in the Agreement. As this
"inducement" proscription is in addition to the other prohibited
purposes, the FCPA is broader than the Agreement in this area.
Second, the Agreement specifically limits its prohibitions to illicit

167.

Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(1)(a), at 3.

168. Id.

169. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (Supp. II 1978).
170. Id.
171.

Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(1)(a), at 3.

172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. H 1978).
173.

Id.
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payments in connection with an "international commercial transaction." The FCPA, in contrast, contains no comparable language. This problem is remedied, however, by the fact that the
FCPA only extends to bribes made to "foreign" officials, political
parties, and candidates for political office.174 Therefore, any illicit
payment made by a United States individual or company to such
a foreign personage or party would most likely be for the purpose
of affecting an "international commercial transaction."
The Agreement and the FCPA are in sharp contrast in the area
of bribe solicitations. The FCPA extends only to the offering or
payment of bribes. Conversely, the Agreement explicitly prohibits
"[t]he soliciting, demanding, accepting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by a public official of any payment, gift or other advantage, as undue consideration for performing or refraining from the
performance of his duties in connexion with an international commercial transaction. ' 17 5 This apparent conflict is alleviated, however, by the existence of other United States legislation prohibiting the solicitation or acceptance of bribes by domestic officials
17 6
and government employees.
There are no significant problems pertaining to penalties and
enforcement under the FCPA and the Agreement. The Agreement only specifies that violations of its antibribery provisions
must be punished by criminal penalties. 1 77 As the FCPA provides
for criminal sanctions, including fines, imprisonment, or both,17 8
it would comply with the requirements of the Agreement in this
respect. The Justice Department fulfills the criminal enforcement
function under the FCPA. 79 It should be noted, however, that
the FCPA also makes provision for civil injunctive actions.' 80
The Agreement's southern Africa provisions have no counterpart within the FCPA or other United States legislation. Under
the Agreement, a contracting state's enterprises and nationals are
prohibited from paying royalties or taxes to "illegal minority regimes" in southern Africa. 81 If taxes or royalties are paid in con-

174. Id.
175. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(1)(b), at 3.
176. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1976). Similar statutes are present at the
state and local level.
177.
178.
179.

Agreement, supra note 6, art. 1(1), at 3.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b) (Supp. H 1978).
See note 63 supra and accompanying text.

180. See notes 65 & 66 supra and accompanying text.
181. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 7(1), at 5.
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travention of this prohibition, the offending businesses or individuals must report the payments to their governments, and in turn
the contracting state must issue reports on the prohibited activities to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 18 2 Additionally, the Agreement prohibits the transfer of assets or other
financial resources to facilitate trade or investment with the
aforementioned territories if those actions are in violation of
United Nations resolutions.183 In contrast, there are no similar
prohibitions against non-military commercial dealings with minority regimes in southern Africa in the FCPA or other United
States legislation. As the Agreement's southern Africa provisions
are bracketed, however, it is evident that there is delegation dissension over their inclusion and there is a possibility they will not
be included in the final text.
It should be noted that since the publication of the draft Agreement's southern Africa provisions both the United States and the
United Nations have lifted their bans on trade with Rhodesia.'"
With reference to the Republic of South Africa, however, the
United Nations' stance has been much more stringent that that of
the United States. 85 It appears, though, that the United States
support of South Africa is slowly lessening. In 1978, the United
States imposed an embargo on exports to South African military
and police forces "to strengthen U.S. implementation of United
Nations Security Resolutions" pertaining to embargoes against
South Africa. 8 ' Additionally, the Senate Foreign Relations Subencommittee on Africa has advocated an end to United18 States
7
couragement of commercial ventures in South Africa.

The Agreement requires contracting states to take "all practicable measures" to prevent violations of the criminal bribery provisions.188 The United States probably would not experience any
problems complying with this provision, providing it adequately
enforces both the FCPA and concomitant revisions made to bring
the FCPA in line with the Agreement. Additionally, the United
182. Id. art. 7(2),(3).
183. Id. art. 7(1).
184. 39 FACTS ON FiLE 960, 976 (1979).
185. The United Nations has passed innumerable resolutions against South

Africa, aimed particularly at its system of apartheid. The United States, France,
and Great Britain frequently have voted in opposition to these resolutions.
186. 38 FACTS ON FI E 135 (1978).

187. Id.
188. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 3, at 4.
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States would have to exhibit strong enforcement of existing legislation pertaining to the solicitation of bribes by public officials
and employees.
An examination of jurisdiction under the FCPA and the Agreement is crucial to an understanding of the interaction between
the two measures. The Agreement requires a contracting state to
establish its jurisdiction over article 1 offenses committed either
within its territory 89 or by its public officials. 190 A contracting
state must also assert jurisdiction over certain types of payments1 91 when the offense is "committed by a national of that
State, provided that any element of that offense, or any act aiding
or abetting that offense, is connected with the territory of that
State."'192 In addition, signatories must establish their jurisdiction
over any article 1 bribery offense having effects within its territory.19 3 It must be noted, however, that this "effects" provision is
bracketed, and therefore might not be included in the final text.
Finally, the Agreement provides that each contracting state must
establish its jurisdiction over any other offense falling within the
scope of the international measure, providing that the offense is
committed by one of its nationals, public officials, or juridical persons, or when it is committed within the state's territory.1 94 This

last provision makes no reference to jurisdiction based on effects
within a nation's borders.
The FCPA is an amendment to the Securities Exchange Act
and its jurisdiction must be discussed in that context.195 While an
in-depth analysis of FCPA legislative jurisdiction is beyond the
scope of this Note,' 96 a cursory examination follows. Extraterritorial jurisdiction under the securities laws has consistently been
interpreted in light of international law. 197 Under the principle of
territorial jurisdiction, if an essential element of a crime occurs
within a sovereign's territory, it may assert jurisdiction over the
offender. 9 1 This theory of jurisdiction, recognized by the United
189. Id. art. 4(1)(a).

190. Id. art. 4(1)(b).
191. Id. art. 4(1)(c).
192. Id.
193. Id. art. 4(1)(d).

194. Id. art. 4(3).
195.
196.

See note 2 supra.
See generally, Note supra note 52.

197. E.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
198.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE UNITED
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States, would fulfill the Agreement's requirements concerning a
contracting state's jurisdiction over offenses committed within its
territory. The nationality theory of jurisdiction under international law states that a country may exert jurisdiction over its
nationals, regardless of where the offense occurred.", Under this
theory, the Agreement's requirements concerning jurisdiction
over both public officials and other nationals would be met. Thus,
the remaining issue is whether the United States can assert jurisdiction over offenses having effects within its territory, as required by the Agreement. United States courts recognize the international law principle of objective territoriality, which states
that jurisdiction can be based on the presence of "effects" within
a nation's territory resulting from a violation of its laws.200 The
nature and extent of the required "effects" varies, however, between different judicial circuits.201 Therefore, although the United
States could comply with this jurisdictional requirement of the
Agreement, the interpretation of "effects" may lack uniformity
within the United States court system.
The Agreement provides that contracting states must recognize
the voidability of international commercial transactions when a
violation of the Agreement is decisive in procuring one of the
party's consent.202 Additionally, contracting states must ensure
that a party has the right to institute judicial proceedings to have
the transaction declared null and void, obtain damages, or
both.203 Under the Exchange Act, to which the FCPA is an
amendment, every contract made or performed in violation of its
provisions are void "as regards the rights of any person who, in
violation of any such provision, rule, or regulation, shall have
204
made or engaged in the performance of any such contract."
Also, the rights and remedies under the Exchange Act are in addition to other rights and remedies in equity or at law.20 5 Therefore, it is unlikely that problems will arise in this area of overlap

STATES §

17 (1965).

199. Harvard Research on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 520 (Supp. 1935).
200. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
201. Compare Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973)
with Bersch v. Drexel Firestone Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975).
202. Agreement, supra note 6, art. 8, at 5.
203. Id.
204. 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1976).

205. Id. 78bb.
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between the Agreement and the FCPA. All contracting states will
undoubtedly recognize the effective deterrent effects of the Agreement's voidability provisions.
The Agreement provides for the free-flow of information and
cooperation in investigations and proceedings by contracting
states.2 °6 This cooperation requirement is limited by the law of
the state requested to give assistance.2"7 Thus, records falling
within the FCPA accounting provision national security exemption would be protected under the Agreement. Additionally, the
Agreement requires negotiations toward bilateral treaties for mutual aid.20 8 As the assistance provisions would aid in enforcement

of the FCPA, it is unlikely that the United States would voice any
objections over their inclusion in the Agreement.
The Agreement requires any contracting state where an offender is found to submit the violator to competent authorities
for prosecution. 209 Furthermore, the Agreement includes farreaching extradition provisions.2 10 These measures would aid the

United States in its enforcement of the FCPA and therefore will
probably receive full United States support.
V.

CONCLUSION

Upon signing the FCPA into law, President Carter made the
following statement: "[The FCPA] can only be fully successful in
combating bribery and extortion if other countries and business
itself take comparable action. Therefore, I hope progress will continue in the United Nations toward the negotiation of a treaty on
illicit payments." 211 The United States is not alone in its desire
for a multilateral approach to the problem of bribery in an international context. In addition to the United Nations efforts that
culminated in the Agreement, the Organization of American
2 12
States has passed a resolution condemning foreign bribery.
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Also, both the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Chamber of Commerce have
for corporate conduct that prohibit illicit
drafted guidelines
2 13
payments.

The United States has a special interest in a multilateral effort
to combat foreign corrupt practices. First, United States businesses subject to the FCPA are at a disadvantage in overseas
competition when foreign companies do not face similar prohibitions.214 Second, if facing the possibility of prosecution in a foreign country, United States corporations would be less likely to
risk making illicit payments. Third, a joint effort would aid in
enforcement of the FCPA, since any international agreement
would most likely contain mutual assistance provisions.
Thus, presented with the United States desire for a multilateral
approach, the next issue is whether the Agreement constitutes an
acceptable tool with which to fight foreign bribery in a commercial context. As examined earlier, there are several obvious
problems with United States support of the Agreement in its present form. The type of businesses covered under the FCPA accounting provisions would have to be expanded. Furthermore, the
permissibility of "grease payments" under the FCPA would have
to be eliminated. Finally, United States foreign policy is not in
alignment with the Agreement's southern Africa provisions. The
last objection is mitigated, however, by the significant dissension
over inclusion of the provisions in the final text and by the changing attitude of the United States towards South Africa. On the
other hand, the Agreement would provide the United States with
several benefits. First, the mutual assistance provisions would aid
in investigations and proceedings against FCPA offenders. Second, extradition would be facilitated. Third, many of the Agreement's provisions would serve as added deterrents against overseas bribery by United States businesses. Last, if a sufficient
number of nations become signatories, the free market system
would be less impaired by illicit payments.
A balancing of the positive and negative aspects of United
States support of the Agreement militates in favor of its acceptance. This is especially true in light of the fact that there is still
time for the United States to bring pressure on the United NaTRANSACTIONS (1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 417, 418 (1978).

213. CP/RES. 154 (167-75).
214. North, supra note 3.
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tions to make desired changes on various issues before the text is
finalized.
MargaretHelen Young

